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The issues of nuclear disarmament, WMD non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear
energy seem to be modestly coming back to the international agenda. Indeed, the UN in-
stitutions that have been somewhat neglected for more than a decade, at least when we
speak about issues listed above, tend to reappear as appropriate forums for it. The new
us administration shows a significant change in attitude towards a number of important
issues on the international agenda, which may be opening new windows of opportunity
for broader compromises and general progress in the field of international security and
global nuclear regime in particular. In that sense, an unanimous adoption of the US-
sponsored UNSC Resolution 1887 in September 2009 may be a good signal and a sig-
nificant step forward. However, sensitivity of the issue, burdened with long lasting
stalemate in the post-Cold War period, coupled with noticeable problems that still have
to be tackled, may represent a reason for concern and scepticism and make the outcome
of this initiative difficult to predict. This is the reason why this article will modestly try
to analyse the substance and potentials of the resolution, offering an assessment of the
environment in which it has been developed and trying to foresee its perspectives in the
future, hopefully contributing to general understanding of these very interesting issues
of global relevance.
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1. Introduction
One may argue that ever since the inven-
tion of weapons and their widespread use in
efforts to influence the processes in societies
and their outcomes, not to speak about con-
temporary warfare and international relations,
there have been various attempts to control
them and try to reduce their lethality and con-
sequence of eventual use.
The technological progress during the
last century and appearance of various types
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(WMD) made these attempts more necessary,
but also more concrete and direct.
During the Cold War, arms control was
necessary owing to the potential risk that po-
litical tensions between the two global poles
within the framework of bipolar system of in-
ternational relations would escalate into a nu-
clear arms conflict with dramatic conse-
quences for both blocks, as well as for the
whole planet. Given the recent developments
in international politics, it becomes more ob-
vious that it is defmitively not off the agenda
in the post-Cold War period and that many
important actors still consider it as a useful
tool in managing some important security
problems. While avoidance of as many con-
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flicts as possible was a dominant strategy of
two big powers during the Cold War, nowa-
days the attitude towards it seems to have
changed somewhat and the use of force as a
tool of influence on international relations ap-
pears not to be excluded as a potential option.'
Furthermore, it seems clear that the ob-
jectives of arms control, which were defined
mainly in accordance with interests of two big
poles during the Cold War, have changed in
the last two decades. Namely, these changes
reflect in a greater emphasis put on strengthen-
ing the mechanisms of control in order to pre-
vent the emergence of some new WMD capa-
bilities, especially in the case of regimes that
are widely labelled as non-democratic and par-
ticularly dangerous and hostile to current in-
ternational order', while obligations taken by
biggest nuclear world powers to properly ver-
ify and subsequently reduce their nuclear arse-
nal does not seem to attract that much attention
at the international arena. On top of that, the
arms control strategic goals from the Cold War
era have been replaced by those referring to
importance of humanitarian and peace-keeping
goals and efforts to develop mechanisms capa-
ble of tackling the new security threats of
'non-state actors'.
During the Cold War, different arms
control initiatives have resulted in a number of
treaties' that regulated the relations between
the nuclear powers and hence, being under-
stood as binding legal acts, contributed to rela-
tive stability on the basis of balance of power
and opened new opportunities for co-operation
and reciprocity. Nevertheless, the approaches
to the aforementioned treaties and attitudes
towards the established nuclear non-
proliferation regime seem to have changed
significantly during the last several decades.
In that period, the regime was continu-
ously facing variety of challenges, while rele-
vance of its main normative backbone, the
aforementioned Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" , became
more and more doubtfuL Apart from that, 'the
situation on the ground', mainly as a geostrate-
gic consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall,
started to change significantly and enabled
some other countries to develop nuclear pro-
grammes that have not always seemed as lim-
ited to civilian purposes. The two countries
that undoubtedly attracted most attention in
that sense - North Korea and Iran - failed on
number occasions to declare important nuclear
activities in line with their international obliga-
tions, while the first one officially confirmed
the possession of nuclear weapons in 2005.
Besides that, indications that some 'not-state
actors' that definitively do not comply with the
basics of international order may be able to
acquire some elements of nuclear technology
led to growing international support for ad hoc
measures mostly not based on the existing in-
ternational legal system. Moreover, the multi-
lateral co-operation within the framework of
NPT was in decline, culminating with the fail-
ure to reach any sustainable compromise at the
2005 NPT Review Conference on issues of the
treaty implementation. As it was clearly stated
by Shannon N. Kile, "the deadlock at the con-
ference highlighted the long-standing and
deepening division between the nuclear 'have'
and 'have not' states over the nature and pur-
pose of the NPT, and it raised doubts about the
future viability of the treaty regime. While
there was general consensus among the state
parties at the conference that the regime was
becoming dangerously debilitated, they did not
agree on the causes or on solutions'".
On top of that, significant concerns have
been voiced by some actors about the change
of approach towards the issue of arms control
and disarmament, from actions based on exist-
ing international legal framework to voluntary
ad hoc alliances in combat against prolifera-
tion ofWMD. On the other hand, the necessity
of the international community to act swiftly
and appropriately tackle the global security
threats in a new strategic environment was the
main argument of those supporting the idea of
paradigmatic shift.
Taking into account the fact that these
issues were directly linked with new strategic
positioning of big world powers in post-Cold
War era, it was obvious that the given interna-
tional climate was not likely to help re-
establishing the regime on nuclear non-
pro liferation and that world needed a new
long-term sustainable arrangement. The new
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US administration seems to be bringing 'the
winds of change' along in that respect and
with its reshaped strategy towards interna-
tional relations appears to be capable of
achieving some new compromises within the
UN on the respective issue. The new UNSC
Resolution 1887 perhaps may offer a window
of opportunity in the forthcoming period. In
order to assess its significance and perspec-
tives, it is important to analyse the interna-
tional environment and momentum in which it
has been adopted, and this is exactly what this
paper will try to offer.
2. Non-proliferation Regime in the
Post-Cold War Era
Analysing the period after the last global
conflict, lasting a bit more than six decades,
one could agree that the pace of changes were
uneven and, despite the fact that plenty of
things have remained the same, there are still
some challenges present in the international
arena for a significant period of time.
On the one hand, we should celebrate the
end of Apartheid, the fall of the Berlin Wall
and unification of Europe enriched with the
process of the EU enlargement to former
communist states. However, on the other hand,
we should not underestimate the fact that there
are still some ongoing long-lasting conflicts
like the one between Israel and Palestine, India
and Pakistan, North and South Korea, as well
as a number of conflicts in Africa.6 In general,
what appears to be predominant in these cases
is a zero-sum approach of actors within the
framework of conflict, coupled with combina-
tion of elements that make external interven-
tion ineffective and unlikely to happen.
Taking into account the aforementioned
problems and their nature, it would not be real-
istic to expect that the end of the Cold War
would end all of them. Thus, while it defini-
tively opened some new possibilities in that
sense, one may find issues that are even more
difficult and unlikely to be easily resolved in a
new strategic environment.
The global security environment in the
post-Cold War era may be explained by some
military expenditure and arms trade data which
show that the US spend more on military than
during the culmination of Cold War tensions',
while international anTIStransfers are still at a
very high level and rising". Even more dis-
couraging is the fact that development and
welfare are still not given the attention they
deserve, whereas enormous amount of funds is
continuously wasted on costs of the ongoing
conflicts and increase of military expenditure.
Furthermore, the consensus on global
WMD non-proliferation regime seems to be
very far from actual implementation, to say
nothing of any signals of positive trends in the
process oftheir total elimination.
In this environment, it seems obvious
that differentiation of the security discourse
changes the attitude of major policy makers
towards principles of risk and conflict avoid-
ance, that appear to be senseless as the old pol-
icy of deterrence would be. Namely, while
some portion of that traditional policy may be
used in a combat against terrorism, it is diffi-
cult to imagine negotiating arms reduction or
some other confidence-building measures. It is
also needless to mention any possibility to
monitor the implementation of any agreement
in that context and some arbitrary bodies in
case of dispute between the two sides, which
was pretty common during the era of bipo lar
system of international relations.
That is why terms like 'prevention' and
'pre-emption' started dominating the discourse
on the development of security strategies in a
new environment on various levels (national,
regional and global). In that sense different
international factors like the EU, NATO, the
UN and others started to develop their conflict
prevention and peace-keeping capacities and
to deploy their forces worldwide." On the other
hand, for some policy makers, especially in the
US 10, it seemed obvious that there was only
one policy left available - a pre-emptive strike.
Based on the idea of tackling and suppressing
the threat before it appears in its full strength,
it was perceived as the only policy that can
guarantee security in given circumstances.
However, as it was already mentioned in
the introduction, the clearest display of unfa-
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vourable environment in post-Cold War inter-
national arena was the institutional and legal
deficit of WMD arms control and disarma-
ment. During the 'dark period' of the Cold
War, these issues were put in certain institu-
tional and normative framework, where
agreements were perceived as legally binding
and their implementation relatively easily
monitored and verified by international bodies
whose formation was a result of a compromise
of parties involved. All these elements, how-
ever imperfect, are obviously missing today,
not to mention the fact that the period when
these issues where dealt with along different
track, from the perspective of defence and se-
curity built by active, voluntary and collabora-
tive means, seemed to be gone at the begin-
ning of the new millennium.
Nevertheless, as Alyson 1.K. Bailes no-
tices, "this disarmament model did not end up
with the Cold War. It extended well into the
mid-1990s, with the Russian-US Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaties of 1991 and 1993
(START I and II), the 1990 CFE Treaty and its
1999 Adaptation Agreement, the 1992 Open
Skies Treaty, the 1993 Chemical Weapon
Convention and the 1996 Comprehensive
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This flowering of
arms control after the fall of the Warsaw Pact
and Soviet Union, when the worst of the dan-
ger might have seemed to be past, did not
strike anyone as contradictory at that time. It
could be rationalised as putting a seal on the
gains of strategic relaxation and limiting risks
within the still unsettled and evolving East-
West relationship.
Equally to the point, it coincided with
the period of large voluntary force reduction
(and scrapping of plans for increases) by all
those most involved in the Cold War. At such
a time, negotiated reductions did not have to
be punitive - as shown by the fact that some
countries cut more deeply than they were
obliged to - but they could offer some assur-
ance that the other side was acting in parallel
and could be called to account if it switched
course. For all this, in retrospect, the post-Cold
War crop of agreements looks not so much
like a new start as like beginning of the end for
traditional arms control. Three of its main
products - START II, the CTBT and the CFE
Adaptation Agreement - have not entered into
force. An important earlier agreement, the So-
viet-US 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, ceased to have force
in 2002 when the USA abrogated it in order to
proceed with its ballistic missile defence pro-
gramme."!'
Hence, it was obvious that international
security infrastructure, especially having in
mind the deficits of WMD arms control and
disarmament regime, was facing serious chal-
lenges at the beginning of the new millennium.
Despite the fact that various players contrib-
uted to that new reality', the fact that the US
at that time represented the only superpower,
gives more leverage to its main determinants
of po licy vis-a-vis analysed issues. In that pe-
riod the country changed its course of security
policy from collective security order to mainly
unilateral approach based on military compo-
nent strengthening, pre-emptive strikes and
offensive counter-proliferation strategies 13,
and this being exercised in practice with mili-
tary intervention in Iraq. As Susan Willett
concludes, "counter-proliferation strategies are
designed with two objectives in mind: a) as an
ultimate defence against possible attack by in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and
b) to seek and destroy illicit weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) facilities. To achieve
these goals, the Bush administration has
evolved a two-pronged strategy: the develop-
ment of a comprehensive National Missile De-
fence (NMD) system, and a revamped nuclear
strategy based on the introduction of a new
generation of low-yield nuclear weapons de-
signed to be used in missions against hardened
underground command centres or hidden
weapons facilities."l4
It should be mentioned that broader sup-
port for redefinition of national security strat-
egy and its reliance on nuclear rearmament
reached its peak after the tragic 9/11, while
slow pace of arms reduction negotiation proc-
ess, lack of its success and the costs seemed to
be the reason for dissatisfaction in some cir-
cles even during the 1990s. It was clear that
'the perfect momentum' for those opposing
arms reduction regime had arrived, so the new
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version of the security strategy of the only su-
perpower was issued in September 2002, and
development of comprehensive National Mis-
sile Defence became one of its main orienta-
tions.
2.1. The US National Missile Defence
The National Missile Defence (NMD)
concept is meant to ensure the defensive capa-
bility against any conventional or nuclear
weapons, and as an idea it originally dates
back to the Reagan's US presidency as a shield
against possible nuclear attack of the USSR.
Following the period of detente and post-Cold
War relaxation of strategic relations that in-
cluded significant nuclear and conventional
disarmament, the 1998 North-Korean test of
ballistic missile again brought back the argu-
ment in favour of creation of NMD system on
the agenda.
However, this initiative faced strong op-
position at the international arena, especially
from the side of Russia and China which ar-
gued that, despite the fact it was presented as a
defensive concept, it would stimulate a new
strategic arms race and negatively affect the
stability of the existing deterrence maxim. The
fact that conduct of NMD initiative had been
given a top priority position in the US admini-
stration agenda at that time significantly con-
tributed to growing tensions and mistrust in
relations among the aforementioned countries
and hence added to already non-favourable
environment at the global level, especially
when speaking about nuclear arms reduction
and WMD non-proliferation regime.
The prevailing impression among Rus-
sian experts and political elites that this initia-
tive has purposely endangered the strategic
stability in relations between the two states led
to the conclusion that vital security interests of
Russia were endangered. As argued by
Stanislav M. Menshikov, according to this
point of view, the NMD could become a threat
to Russia's deterrence capability if it gained
the capacity of intercepting more incoming
warheads than Russia can effectively retaliate
with against a theoretical first strike by the
United States. In that context, the NMD is per-
ceived as a part of an offensive rather than of a
purely defensive force. 15
According to the aforementioned domi-
nant opinion in Russia, the only proper re-
sponse would be its decline to reduce the
number of nuclear warheads within the
framework of SORT agreemenr'" and conduct
of intense modernisation of its nuclear capac-
ity, which would dramatically narrow down
any possibilities for arms reduction in general.
The development of the NMD by the US
had a significant negative effect on relations
with China in particular, because with several
times smaller nuclear arsenal than Russia, it
felt even more concerned about its deterrence
capacity in probable new circumstances.
Therefore, according to some reports'", China
started to invest into development and mod-
ernisation of its nuclear arms that contributed
to global backsliding in terms of WMD reduc-
tion.
In that kind of environment it was obvi-
ously difficult to seek for compromise and
confidence-building measures, to say nothing
of any decisive common position or action and
therefore not only arms control of major nu-
clear actors, but also WMD non-proliferation
to other 'rogue states', appeared to be too dif-
ficult to properly deal with. Hence, countries
like North Korea, Iran and others found the
way to use that constellation, which led to the
lack of efficiency of global intergovernmental
mechanisms that were supposed to deal with
these issues of concern. While major nuclear
actors continued pursuing only their own na-
tional interests and trying to spread their zones
of exclusive interest and influence, bodies like
the UN Security Council18 proved to be unable
either to obtain common position or initiate
any common action, in order to tackle these
security challenges. That led to the aforemen-
tioned selective formation of 'coalition of the
willing', bypass ofUNSC procedure by differ-
ent actors when dealing with security issues of
regional and/or global significance and accord-
ingly overall decline of legitimacy of that UN
body in given sense. That is why it was obvi-
ous that serious changes in attitudes of major
players had to take place in order to make ex-
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isting global architecture functional or ensure
its reformation in the period to come.
3. Signs of Change
Changes in both the US and Russia in
2008 signalled that there might be a window of
opportunity for a different approach towards
nuclear arms reduction regime and non-
proliferation of WMD. Notably, the first in-
centives came from the US side, where the
new Obama administration seemed to be
showing intention to change some conflicting
determinants of its predecessor and hence to
contribute significantly to broader co-
operation within the international arena, in
particular with the most important factors.
Despite the fact that the economic crisis
was dominating the new president's agenda
during his first hundred days in office, there
were some noticeable signals of change of the
foreign policy course of the new US state ad-
ministration. Apart from certain form of rap-
prochement to the Arab world in general, in-
cluding the announcement of the closure of
Guantanamo campus, responsible withdrawal
of troops from Iraq, re-initiation of dialogue
with countries labelled as parts of axis of evil
by the previous administration (Syria, Iran'",
etc.), it has shown the willingness to change
the US attitude towards the climate change and
build a more constructive relationship with
China and Russia on various issues. Indeed,
and that is very important for the fIeld of this
research, the new administration listed the
arms control and non-proliferation of WMD
among its top foreign policy priorities, which
is more than noticeable at the official web-site
of the White House: "On April 5, 2009, in
Prague, President Obama presented an ambi-
tious strategy to address the international nu-
clear threat. He proposed measures to: reduce
and eventually eliminate existing nuclear arse-
nals, including negotiations on further nuclear
reductions with Russia, ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and
completion of a verified Fissile Material Cut-
off Treaty; halt proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons to additional states, and prevent terrorists
from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.
We have pledged to work with our partners to
achieve the denuclearization of North Korea
through the Six-Party process. And we will
present a clear choice to Iran to take its right-
ful place in the community of nations, includ-
ing its right to peaceful nuclear energy, or con-
tinue to refuse to meet its international obliga-
tions and fail to seize the opportunity of a
positive future. ,,20
These were the initial small steps, but
they seemed to have opened the windows of
opportunities for improvements in the field of
international co-operation, especially with re-
gards to coming closer to taking a common, or
at least harmonised, position vis-a-vis major
global security challenges.
A significant step ahead in that sense
was undoubtedly a US decision to abandon its
plans for a land-based missile defence system
in the Czech Republic and Poland that was
warmly welcomed in many European coun-
tries, and China and Russia in particular".
Unlike that concept, which attempted to offer a
relatively weak solution as a strong response
to challenges, the new administration seemed
to have achieved at least two things with that
decision: displaying seriousness about disar-
mament and putting additional pressure on
countries like Russia and China. Those coun-
tries proved not to be willing to compromise
on issues of the biggest concern of transatlan-
tic community within the UNSC, especially if
we speak about increasing international sanc-
tions to North Korean and Iran for failing to
keep their nuclear activities in line with their
international obligations and responsibilities."
Since relations between DC and Moscow
seemed to be determining the pace of devel-
opment at the international arena concerning
WMD disarmament and non-proliferation, it is
interesting to try to assess the way Russia
should respond to the new dynamics. It may be
assumed that in this new environment Russia
could display flexibility regarding the talks on
WMD cuts as well as on the policy towards
North Korea and especially Iran. This could be
expected due to the fact that both sides, after a
pretty long period, are facing possibility to
create an image of fruitful collaboration. How-
ever, neither of them is risking almost any-
thing under the given circumstances, owing to
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the fact that they still have several times bigger
nuclear arsenal than the one needed to secure
an efficient deterrence against possible threats.
Despite the fact that there are still some
existing arguments that should make Russia
reluctant to compromise on the aforemen-
tioned issues'', it is obvious that the context of
relations with the West, at least when taking
into account Russia's surrounding, has some-
what changed.
As it was noticed by Anatol Lieven,
"when it comes to the most serious issues di-
viding Russia and the West and threatening
Russian influence in its neighbourhood, Russia
has actually won. When the West was pushing
forward against Russia, it made sense for Rus-
sia to push back wherever possible; but in the
wake of last year's Georgian attack on South
Ossetia and the West's failure to save Georgia
from Russia's response, the NATO member-
ship for Georgia is almost certainly dead as a
nail. America's loss of relative power and its
immense commitments elsewhere made this
even more probable. In the wake of the present
economic recession and the European Union's
internal problems, the EU membership for
Ukraine is also a dead issue. There is no real
need any longer therefore for Russia to fear the
expansion of Western influence, or to hold
back from supporting the West over Iran in the
hope of extracting concessions elsewhere. So,
if Moscow refuses to make any positive re-
sponse to this latest step of Obama's it will en-
sure that future Democratic attitudes to Russia
in Washington will be every bit as bad as Re-
publican ones. After all, president Obama by
this step is taking a very serious risk in domes-
tic po litical terms, and the Russian government
needs to recognize this and respond accord-
ingly.,,24
The thing seem to be moving in that di-
rection at the bilateral meeting between the US
and Russian presidents on margins of the UN
General Assembly in September 2009, where
Mr Medvedev signalled that Moscow might be
prepared to soften its opposition to further
sanctions against Iran over its nuclear plans.
While he stated that "in some cases sanctions
where inevitable", an unnamed Russian offi-
cial did not rule out the UN sanctions against
Iran "if there are objective grounds, which
means that the criteria are not individual
evaluations, not guesswork, but the report and
the recommendations of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).,,25
3.1. The New UNSC Resolution
Stimulated predominantly by the issues
of North Korean and Iranian 'nuclear efforts'
that were widely perceived as a serious threat
to international security, as well as by general
stalemate on international nuclear arms control
regime, heads of states gathered at the UNSC
meeting on 24 September 2009 to discuss the
issues of nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation ofWMD.
The new US administration, apart from
gaining the concession from Russia to take
into consideration new and more restrictive
sanctions against Iran, made progress on se-
curing support from Russia and China for a
UNSC resolution that promotes the idea of nu-
clear weapons reduction and strengthening of
international regime and institutions in that
sense. As it was previously underlined, the
success where mostly a consequence of shift
of the US foreign policy, i.e. a beginning of a
new era of engagement with other factors of
international politics and delineation from
po licies 0 f previous administration. 26
So, at the mentioned meeting, unani-
mously su~porting the US sponsored Resolu-
tion 18872 , the UNSC opted for a support to
new global efforts to contribute to the effec-
tiveness of arms reduction regime, combat
against proliferation of WMD and control of
fissile material. With the aim of empowering
the international regime in that field, the sum-
mit contributed to enhancing the opportunities
to provide the technical assistance for peaceful
use of nuclear energy as well as to respect the
provisions of existing international treaties,
including the prevention of misapplication of
the NPT withdrawal ctause." It also repre-
sented an occasion to rethink the capacity of
states to fight against networks 0f pro liferation
and their means of financing, while strength-
ening implementation of UNSC Resolution
1540 from 2004.29
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In light of a need to strengthen the
mechanism of international regime on referent
field, the importance of this first comprehen-
sive endeavour during last fifteen years may
be seen from the fact that the Resolution ex-
plicitly endorses the UNSC as a body that as-
sumes the primary responsibilitlc in addressing
nuclear issues on a global level. 0
A strong support to one of the funda-
mental treaties, the aforementioned NPT, was
reaffirmed, together with an appeal to coun-
tries that are still not signatories to become
ones. Apart from that, a compliance require-
ment was voiced, together with the idea about
a need to strengthen all three of its pillars -
disarmament of countries currently possessing
nuclear weapons, non-proliferation to coun-
tries not yet in possession and the peaceful use
of nuclear energy for all.31 Mostly as conse-
quence of the new US approach to referent is-
sues, the resolution was not explicit with re-
gards to naming the countries whose nuclear
activities seem to be worrisome for interna-
tional community and therefore only 'major
challenges to international regime ,32 were
called to comply entirely with their obligations
and encouraged to negotiate on that matter
with partners from international community
and specialised institutions in particular. In
that sense, the resolution reinforces its support
to the work of IAEA33, affrrms importance of
its effective safeguards to prevention of WMD
proliferation and co-operation in the field of
peaceful use of nuclear energy and encourages
all parties to fully co-operate with the agency,
which is of utmost importance having in mind
the aforementioned need to strengthen the in-
stitution of international 'nuclear regime' .34
Related to the role of IAEA, and possi-
ble trends in which its development may be
contributing to the effectiveness of global nu-
clear regime, it is important to mention the
remarks of its Secretary General (Dr Mohamed
EI Baradei) made at that UNSC meeting.
While reflecting on its current fragility and
many shortcomings, he underlined the impor-
tance to strengthen the agency, internationalize
the control of nuclear fuel cycle and more
closely interlink the issues of nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament, calling for the
demonstration of unquestionable determina-
tion to achieve a world free of nuclear weap-
ons. In his words, "Our verification mandate is
centred on nuclear material. If the agency is to
be expected to pursue possible weaponisation
activities, it must be empowered with the cor-
responding legal authority ...Our ultimate goal
should be the full multinationalisation of the
fuel cycle as we move towards nuclear disar-
mament...! am gratified to see nuclear disar-
mament back at the top of international
agenda, as well as the recognition of the intrin-
sic link between nuclear disarmament and non-
pro liferation. ,,35
Reflecting upon a need for a more effec-
tive international contro I mechanisms in the
given field, this resolution also urged states to
raise standards of nuclear security in order to
reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, strengthen
export control and prevent illicit trafficking of
nuclear materials.' Furthermore, it reaffrrms
the need for full implementation ofthe Resolu-
tion 1540 (2004) with an aim of preventing
access to, or assistance and fmancing for,
WMD, related materials and their means of
delivery by non-state actors, which reflects the
continuity in the UNSC's orientation towards
the fight against WMD proliferation"
Taking into consideration all characteris-
tics of the resolution that was analysed here,
especially while having in mind the shortcom-
ings and other serious problems of the global
'nuclear regime', one may conclude that it is
undoubtedly a step forward and, depending on
further developments on respective issues,
may open new windows of opportunity in the
future. However, having said that, one has to
bear in mind the fact that it is not legally bind-
ing, and in order to become so, the UNSC
would have to require the states to take more
concrete steps in the direction of nuclear arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation,
including making their nuclear exports subject
to further restrictions. Furthermore, the NPT
review conference has been scheduled for
spring 2010 and it seems obvious that only
significant improvements there would prove
that this resolution has made a noticeable
added value to the existing global 'nuclear re-
gime'. In that sense, one should be aware of
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the fact that serious obstacles to success still
lie ahead on national levels, including some
major states, with regard to some concrete ac-
tion in the field of nuclear disarmament as well
as to ratification and implementation of some
'nuclear regime' legislation that are pending
for long time.38
However, notwithstanding these difficul-
ties, there seems to be a trend that adoption of
this resolution has brought along, which un-
doubtedly should not be underestimated, given
the praxis that prevailed during last decade or
so. The fact that the discussion on the issues of
global relevance appears to be brought back
within the framework of the UN institutions,
no matter how imperfect they are and what-
ever lies in their background, au contraire to
the aforementioned 'coalition of the willing'
functioning mode, where the decisions are
made on the basis of compromise, may be
considered as a significant step forward in ef-
forts to strengthen or even revitalise global
institutions. Furthermore, in that framework,
even small countries with very modest re-
sources and global influence are offered the
opportunity to have a voice in issues of sig-
nificant importance for the international com-
munity. In the light of the UN's obvious need
to regain global legitimacy and despite the fact
that it is almost impossible to question pre-
dominance of the most influential countries in
the issues of international concern, it is impor-
tant that the small ones also have the opportu-
nity to obtain a position of a non-permanent
member of the UNSC and in accordance with
their modest capacities contribute to contem-
porary stability and welfare ofthe globe."
4. Conclusions
One may conclude that the UNSC meet-
ing analysed here represented a new step in
international efforts to ensure preconditions
necessary to achieve a world free of nuclear
weapons. In that light, the new UNSC Resolu-
tion 1887 clearly displays an international
concern over a stalemate in nuclear disarma-
ment, WMD proliferation threat and a neces-
sity for substantial action at the international
level to address these challenges. It is impor-
tant to stress that, as it was shown in the see-
tion that offered an in-depth analysis of the
text of the resolution, it reaffrrms that these
issues are a serious threat to global security,
showing a broad consensus on a number of
actions required to tackle them. Broadly for-
mulated, hence avoiding to point at any single
country explicitly'", the draft of the resolution
removed certain reservations among some
countries and made itself more likely to be
passed. As it was interpreted by Neil MacFar-
quhar and Helene Cooper, "The Resolution
1887 was meant to produce a renewed interna-
tional effort to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons, with an eye toward an international
review conference on the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty next spring, as well as to
finally win the passage of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. Among other goals, it tries to
improve security around nuclear weapons ma-
terials to prevent them from falling into the
hands of terrorists; says the council will act
against those who provide such material to ter-
rorists; and calls to efforts to strengthen export
controls on nuclear-related materials for the
detection, deterrence and disruption of illegal
trafficking in those materials.?"
What seems to be of paramount impor-
tance is the fact that this resolution also con-
tains a clause which implies that countries
would be held responsible for activities that
infringe the propositions of the NPT even after
their possible withdrawal from it. In other
words, among other important facts, this reso-
lution is focused at 'fixing the loopholes' of
NPT, that contributed significantly to keeping
the number of countries that posses nuclear
arsenals pretty low, but shows its shortfalls
during the last decade or so as well as 'a need
for backup'. Using the vocabulary of nuclear
armament strategies, this provision should
serve as a certain form of deterrence from
withdrawal out of the NPT and insurance for
reduction ofWMD proliferation threats as well
as for the usage of nuclear energy in the
framework that complies with highest interna-
tional security standards.Y
Notwithstanding its shortfalls and prob-
lems with implementation, the NPT still seems
to be the main tool for the possible successful
conduct of the idea of world free ofWMD. Its
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review conference scheduled for spring 2010,
may appear to be a unique opportunity for the
international community to defme 'a progres-
sive agenda' that encompasses three main pil-
lars of that treaty. This resolution offers an op-
portunity for international compromise and
increased political will that is undoubtedly
needed to empower the legitimacy and author-
ity of the NPT, including the strengthening of
the review process that holds parties responsi-
ble for the international commitments they
have made.
As any other international agreement,
this resolution has been a subject to interpreta-
tions from various standpoints." While there
seems to be at least a broad consensus that this
was a very important step forward, the one
having a less optimistic approach may not find
it that outstanding or immensely important for
future nuclear disarmament, arguing that ex-
traordinary euphoria about that resolution may
be distracting the attention from the enormous
amount of work that still lies ahead. The
unanimous adoption of a resolution defini-
tively does not occur very frequently when
issues of international security are at stake.
Thus the adoption of this resolution may be
considered only as a consequence of the way it
has been written. It contains enough ambigui-
ties to allow countries with very different posi-
tions and interests to agree on it, as well as of
the fact that the resolution actually did not se-
riously bind them to change their strategic ori-
entation and actions in this regard. 44
Viewing the issue from this perspective,
it could be concluded that although it is a no-
ticeable step ahead, the unanimously passed
resolution is more a consequence of its formu-
lation and composition than of any significant
compromise on global level. Thus, if anything
is taken as certain, that is the fact that there is a
huge amount of work still to be done.
There is no reason to underestimate the
ratio behind this approach, especially taking
into account 'the track record' of nuclear dis-
armament and non-proliferation during the last
fifteen years and serious obstacles to a broader
success in that field in the future. However, the
fact that the main promoters seem to be aware
of those difficulties seems 'promising' - "The
next 12 months will be absolutely critical in
determining whether this resolution and our
overall efforts to stop the spread and use of
nuclear weapons are successful. And all na-
tions must do their part to make this work. In
America, I have promised that we will pursue
a new agreement with Russia to substantially
reduce our strategic warheads and launch-
ers. We will move forward with the ratifica-
tion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
and open the door to deeper cuts in our own
arsenal. In January, we will call upon coun-
tries to begin negotiations on a treaty to end
the production of fissile material for weap-
ons. And the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference in May will strengthen that agree-
ment. We harbour no illusions about the diffi-
culty of bringing about a world without nu-
clear weapons. We know there are plenty of
cynics, and that there will be setbacks to prove
their point. But there will also be days like to-
day that push us forward - days that tell a dif-
ferent story.,,45
What is important and should be under-
lined again is that this reso lution reaffrrms the
three main pillars of the existing 'nuclear re-
gime', promoting their interconnectedness, and
further encourages countries that possess nu-
clear arsenal to downsize it and to orientate
towards their future elimination. Referring to
the importance of signals of determinacy from
the side of its main promoter - the US - it is
worthwhile mentioning that it restores a few
commitments relinquished by the previous
administration", including the one to ratify the
CTBT. Furthermore, it is important to notice
that this approach seems to be gaining interna-
tional support - the British Prime Minister an-
nounced that his country would consider cut-
ting its nuclear forces by 25%47, the French
President voiced his support, while Russians
and Chinese also seem to have taken more
constructive role, not to mention strong sup-
port from leaders of various nuclear 'have-
nots'.
Ir
In conclusion, despite the fact that one
would fmd it very difficult to predict the de-
velopment of the issues analysed here, espe-
cially taking into account serious obstacles that
are still to be tackled in the future, and admit-
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ting that cautiousness seems to be conditio
sine qua non of any rational and reliable reca-
pitulation in this case, it seems difficult to de-
fend the opinion that this initiative does not
'deserve'or stand a chance to gain a broad
support on international level in order to repre-
sent a significant step ahead in efforts to rid
the world of nuclear weapons. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that it is surely imperfect and that
probably its shortcomings would have to be
dealt with in the future, one should not under-
estimate the fact that it represents the onlyat-
tempt to confront the stalemate on this field
that lasts for more than a decade. Therefore,
however it may sound unrealistic and naive, it
would be nice to see that realpolitik approach,
balance of power and deterrence move away at
least a bit and leave the floor for future-ori-
ented international concepts that would lead to
substantial WMD disarmament and nuclear-
weapons- free world for generations to come.
•
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